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Abstract
How governments  regulate  food safety and  countries. The results suggest that a 10 percent increase
environmental  protection,  including pesticide residue  in regulatory stringency-tighter  restrictions on the
levels,  has important implications  for trade. The World  pesticide chlorpyrifos-leads  to a decrease  in banana
Trade Organization  (WTO) Ministerial  held in Doha,  imports by 14.8 percent.  This represents a significant
Qatar in November 2001  included  statements on  impact on trade and affect prospects of developing
standards and their impact on market access for  countries who continue to rely on exports of agricultural
developing countries.  These issues  will continue  to be  commodities, such as bananas. The findings also suggest
important in trade policy dialogues. It is assumed-and  that the lack of consensus on international  standards and
evidence  from recent analysis confirms-that  food safety  divergent national  regulations on pesticides  is costly. For
standards can affect the ability of agricultural  producers  example, the authors estimate that if the world were  to
to meet regulatory  standards set by importing countries.  adopt a standard  at a level of regulatory stringency
Wilson and Otsuki explore a  fundamental question  in  suggested by Codex (the body charged with setting
food safety and environmental  standards:  Do regulations  global standards in this area),  in contrast with one set at
on pesticide have  an effect on trade?  the level  in place  in the European  Union, there would be
The authors  examine regulatory data from 11  OECD  a US$5.3 billion loss in world exports.
importing countries and trade data from 19 exporting
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How  governments  regulate  food  safety  and  environmental  protection,  including
pesticide  residue  levels,  has  important implications  for international  trade.  Within this
context,  the growing use of pesticides  accounts for a significant portion of the increase in
food  productivity  over  the  past  several  decades.  Pesticides  clearly  have  assisted  in
controlling pests and maintaining the  availability of low cost and high quality food.  For
example,  Owens  (1986)  reports that crop  and livestock  production  in the United  States
would drop by 25 to 30 percent,  and prices of agricultural products would increase by 50
to  75  percent,  if pesticides were  completely  withdrawn  from  use.  Pesticides  also  allow
for improved storage and distribution of crops,  fruits, and grains.
There  are  also  health  risks,  however,  associated  with  pesticides.  These  risks
include on-farm ingestion by workers,  discharge of toxic chemicals  into the air and water,
and consumption of foods that contain pesticide residues by consumers.
Setting a balance between risk and methods to increase agricultural productivity  is
particularly important  for developing  countries.  Many  developing  countries  depend  on
food  exports  for  exchange  earning,  particularly  in  cash  crops.  Bananas  provide
governments  of exporting  countries  in  Latin  America,  for example,  exchange  earnings
with  which  to  undertake  important  development  plans  and  programs.  They  are  the
world's  fourth  most  important  export  commodity  and  food  crop  (World  Bank  1999).
Developing  countries  constituted  20 percent of the total world  demand for pesticides  in
21995.  The  World Bank  estimates  that demand will  grow to  40 percent  over the period
1995 to 2000 (Poapongsakom et al.,  1999).  Moreover, the most hazardous  pesticides are
still used in developing countries.  Many of these are now banned or heavily regulated  in
developed  countries.  For example,  Thailand  imports  large  quantities  of World  Health
Organization (WHO)  I and II (most hazardous) pesticides (Poapongsakom et al.,  1999).'
The way in which pesticides  are regulated and standards set for minimum residue
levels  are  also  of importance  relative  to  developing  country  exports.  The  costs  of
compliance  with tighter  food  safety  standards  by  exporters  can  be  high.  Otsuki  et  al.
(2001a, 2001b)  suggests  that a change in food safety  standards of one importing  country
affects  a  broad  range  of  exporting  countries.  Forgone  exports  due  to  additional
compliance costs with more restrictive standards can be significant.
The  increasingly  contentious  debate  over the balance  between  risk,  precaution,
and multilateral  trade obligations  increases  the utility of empirical  analysis  on the effect
of standards on trade.  This paper attempts to broaden understanding of how standards  on
pesticide  residues  affect  bananas  exports.  We  conducted  an  empirical  analysis  of the
relationship  between  pesticide  residue  standards  in  11  Organization  for  Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and banana exports from  19 developing
countries.  A  gravity  model  is  used  to  examine  the  hypothesis  that  pesticide  residue
standards  can be  trade limiting.  Chlorpyrifos  standards  are  investigated,  as  it is one  of
the most commonly used pesticides in worldwide banana production.
1  The World Health Organization (WHO)  has classified pesticides into four categories (I, II, III, and IV)
with the lower numbers indicating higher level of toxicity.
3The  organization  of this paper  is as follows.  Section 2 reviews toxic pesticides
that are or have  been commonly  used in the  world along with their  health implications.
Section 3 reviews  the European  Union (EU) and international  policies  regarding banana
trade  and pesticide residues  in food imports.  Section 4 provides  an overview  of global
banana trade.  Section  5 develops  an empirical  framework  to  analyze  the  relationship
between  pesticide  residue  standards  and  bilateral  trade  flows.  Section  6  reports  the
results and predicts trade flows under alternative levels of harmonized  standards.
Section 7 provides policy implications of the analysis.
2.  Health hazards of pesticides
2.1  General issues
Pesticides are diverse  and omnipresent.  Approximately  1400 pesticides are being
used  worldwide.  Commonly  used  pesticides  include  herbicides  (destroys  unwanted
weeds  and plants), insecticides (kills insects  and other arthropods),  rodenticide  (controls
mice  and  other rodents),  and fungicides  (kills  fungi).  All  pesticides  are  toxic  by their
nature,  and  hence,  they  cause  human  and  animal  health  hazards  through  exposure  or
dietary intake.
Prior  Informed  Consent  (PIC)  held  in  September  1998  identified  22  harmful
pesticides  and five industrial  chemicals  that have been banned or severely  restricted  in a
number of countries  and required that these pesticides  cannot  be exported unless agreed
4by the  importing country.  The PIC list included the following 22 hazardous  pesticides.2
Pesticides such as DDT, Chlordane,  Lindane and Aldrin have been completely banned or
severely restricted in North America and Europe because  of their acute toxicity.
Pesticide residues to the local  environment (air,  soil and surface  water) affect the
lives  of birds,  wildlife,  domestic  animals,  fish,  livestock  and  human  beings.  Human
health  hazards vary with the type  of the pesticides  and also  with the extent of exposure.
Moderate  human health hazards  from pesticides include mild headaches,  flu, skin rashes,
blurred  vision  and  other  neurological  disorders  while  rare,  but  severe  human  health
hazards  include  paralysis,  blindness, and even death.  (GAO,1994).  A study by Repetto
and  Baliga  (1996)  shows  that  pesticides  can  damage  the  human  immune  system  by
reducing  the number  of white  blood  cells and  disease  fighting  lymphocytes.  Long run
health  impacts  include  cancer,  infertility,  miscarriage,  male  sterility,  birth  defects,  and
effects on the nervous system.
Farm workers  are  at much  greater risk of toxicity  due to  exposure to  pesticides.
According to  the United  States  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  approximately
4 million U.S.  farm  workers are  at high risk of pesticide  exposure  and  about  10,000 to
20,000 pesticide-poisoned  farm workers  are treated  every year.  Risk of birth defects  is
reported  with certain pesticides, particularly,  the herbicide 2,4-D used in farmland (Garry
et al.,  1996).  Pingali  et al.  (1994)  found a  greater probability  of eye and skin problems
2 They are 2,4,5-T, Aldrin, Captafol,  Chlordane,  Chlordimeform,  Chlorobenzilate,  DDT, Dieldrin, Dinoseb,
1,2-dibromoethane  (EDB), Fluoroacetamide,  HCH, Heptachlor,  Hexachlorobenzene,  Lindane, Mercury
compounds,  certain formulations of Monocrotophos,  Methamidophos,  Phosphamidon,  Methyl-parathion
and Parathion. The industrial chemicals are: Crocidolite, Polybrominated  Biphenyls  (PBB), Polychlorinated
Biphenyls (PCB), Polychlorinated Terphenyls  (PCT), Tris (2,3 dibromopropyl) phosphate.
5associated  with  on-site  use  of  pesticides  among  rice  producers  in  the  Philippines.3
Crissman  et  al.  (1994)  found  a  link  between  pesticide  use  and  incidence  of chronic
dermatitis  among  Ecuadorian  potato  producers.4 Also,  the  EPA  (1992)  reports  that  a
significant  population  of  Nebraska  farm  workers  had  reduced  levels  of  blood
cholinesterase,  a common symptom of organophosphate exposure.
People residing  close to  farmland  can also  experience  pesticide related problems
due to dumping of pesticide wastes, wind drafts from aerial  spraying, or from the use of
empty pesticide containers for drinking  water storage.  Repetto and Baliga  (1996) found
that  in  Nicaragua,  people  living  near  cotton  fields  sprayed  with  insecticides  had
depressed  cholinesterase  levels that may occur due to exposure to common  insecticides
like  organophosphates.  The  EPA  estimated  that  between  less  than  1 percent  of the
community  water  systems  and  rural  domestic  wells  had  concentration  of pesticide
residues higher than maximum allowable  level.
Risk  of dietary  exposure  to  pesticide  residues  are  of  much  concern.  The
probability  of  estimated  aggregated  cancer  risk5 turned  out  to  be  0.006  assuming
consumption  of food  with  residues  at  the  level  of maximum  residue  limit  (National
3According to Pmgali et al. 's (1994) case study over the period  1989-1991,  the probability of eye
abnormalities  among the sample households was 17 percent higher when three doses of insecticide were
applied instead of one recommended amount.  They also indicate that the probability of having skin
problems was 20 percent higher when two applications  of herbicide were applied instead of one application
as  recommended.  Insecticides include  organophosphates such as methylparathion and chlorpyrifos,
carbamates  such as BPMC, carbaryl, and carbofuran and pyrethroids such as cypermethrin  and
deltamethrin.  Butachlor was the primary herbicide  used.  These insecticides are WHO Class I and II, and
these herbicides are Class IV chemicals.
4According to Crissman et al.'s (1994) study in 1991-1992,  93 percent of the farm workers exposed to
pesticides have skin problems compared to 81 percent in the sample group of nonexposed farm workers.
Chronic dermatitis  was 28 percent compared to  14 percent in the sample  group.
5  Excess cancer risk estimates the probability that a person will die from cancer due to exposure of
pesticides based on the current number of survivors to such exposures.
6Research  Council,  1987).  Some  pesticides,  e.g.  dieldrin,  DDT  and  heptachlor,  whose
registration  has  been  cancelled,  have  higher  cancer  risks  than  the  normally  used
pesticides.  In  an  EPA  report  of 1987,  pesticides  in  food  were  considered  to  be  most
hazardous  to  human  health.  The  EPA  identified  55  pesticides  that  could  leave
carcinogenic  residues  in  food  (National  Academy  of  Sciences,  1987).  However,  no
evidence was found that the presence of pesticide residues in food contribute significantly
to cancer risk in the U.S.  (National Academy of Sciences,  1989).  Most fresh produce in
California in  1990 contained negligible amounts of residues that are above the maximum
residue limits (American  Council on Science and Health,  1998).6
2.2  Chlorpyrifos  pesticides and health implications
In this paper we focus on a particular insecticide  known as chlorpyrifos.  It is one
of the more  widely used organophosphates 7 and is categorized  as a  Class II pesticide  by
the  WHO,  indicating  a  moderately  high  level  of  toxicity.  According  to  the  EPA,
chlorpyrifos  is mainly used on agricultural farms, and in non-agricultural  settings such as
homes, office buildings,  schools  and warehouses.  It is used  as a perimeter treatment that
is  sprayed  to  kill  ants,  mites,  cockroaches,  crickets,  grasshoppers,  millipedes,  etc.
(USEPA 2000).  Pinese and Elder (1994), points  out that chlorpyrifos  is commonly  used
to repel rust thrips in banana production.  For example, Chiquita Brands International Inc,
one of the world's  largest banana companies,  uses  a method to  impregnate  chlorpyrifos
6 Only 0.17 percent contained residues above the allowable  limits, and 0.62 percent had residues of
pesticides that are not legalized for that commodity.
7Organophosphates  account  for about 50% of the insecticides used in the U.S.
(http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/op/chlorpyrifos/consumerqs.htm  #2)
7on  the  bags  that  cover  ripening  bananas,  in  order  to  protect  them  from  rust
thrips.(Gallagher,  McWhirter  and Wells  1998).
This  pesticide  can  over-stimulate  the  nervous  system  causing  nausea,  lung
congestion,  chest pain,  and dizziness.  At high exposure  levels,  it can cause  respiratory
paralysis and death.  It is highly toxic to fish, crab, shrimp,  birds and other wildlife.  Risk
mitigation  acts  by  the  EPA  currently  include  the  gradual  elimination  in  the  use  of
chlorpyrifos by homeowners and limited use in agriculture and in other professions.
3.  Pesticide residue standards and food  trade
The Acceptable  Daily Intake  (ADI) of the pesticide  residue which is established
"on the  basis of a  complete  review  of the  available  information,  including  data  on the
biochemical,  metabolic,  pharmacological,  and toxicological properties  of the pesticide  is
derived from studies of experimental  animals and observations in humans"  (GEMS/Food,
1997).  The  total  dietary  intake  of a  particular  pesticide  residue  in a  food  product  is
calculated by summing over consumption of all the food containing the residue, weighted
by the maximum residue level (MRL) of a particular pesticide in each food.8
MRLs on food imports were  generally set individually by each country, and they
have  been  referred  to  as  regulatory  standards  at  the  border.  While  regional  trade
arrangements  were  formed,  some  effort  to  harmonize  MRLs  have  been  made  in  the
1990's.
The European  Union has  been  implementing  a program  to harmonize  MRLs  of
pesticides in food sold since  1993  (Chan and King, 2000).  Between  1993  and July 2000,
8  The  MRL  is  an  index  that  represents  the  maximum  concentration  of a pesticide  residue  (expressed  as
mg/kg) legally permitted in food commodities and animal feeds.
8the  EU  established  MRLs  for specific  crop  and  pesticide  combinations  for  102  active
pesticide ingredients.  For several  crop  and pesticide combinations,  however, acceptable
data to establish MRLs were not available.  In July 2000, the position for 102 pesticides
or  active  ingredients  were  closed  off.  Data  were  not  available  for  some  crop/active
ingredient  combinations,  and the MRL was  set at the  analytical  Limit of Determination
(LOD)  i.e.,  analytical  zero  for  that  combination.  All  of  the  EU  MRL  pcisitions
established in July 2000 were approved and implemented  as national legislation by all of
the EU member countries in July 2001  (Chan and King, 2000).  Another set of MRLs for
585  pesticides  were  closed  off in December  2000  with the  legislation  intendecl  to  be
implemented  in  December  2001.  The  EC  legislation  also  required  member  and
nonmember  countries to monitor pesticide residues  in  food.  Failure  to do  so by March
2000  led  to  suspension  of imports  from  43  countries  (WTO  G/SPS/R/20,  January  16,
2001).
In the U.S., only pesticides that have been licensed can  be used or sold based on
the  standards  set  by the  Food  Quality  Protection  Act of  1996.  The  EPA  reviews  all
pesticides  to  ensure  that  they  meet  the  requirements  of the  act.  The  first  group  of
pesticides  to be  reviewed  by  the EPA were  organophosphates  (including  chlorpyrifos).
According to Young,  Rao and Cort (1996), a typical pesticide has to go through  100 tests
before  it gets approved  for use  in the U.S.,  and  the entire  process  can  take more than
three  years.  Once  approved,  labeling  instructions  must  be  developed  for  proper  use,
handling,  storage and disposal.  The OECD countries  also have environmental  programs
to  regulate  pesticide  residue  standards  and  manage  risk  from  pesticides.  The  Working
9Group of Pesticides of the OECD conducts risk assessments of pesticides that have been
on the market for a long time, and on newly developed pesticides (US EPA 2001).
In Japan, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries  implemented the first
pesticide  residue standard  set on apples in  1956 (Sapporo  City Institute of Public Health
of Japan,  19979).  By  1978,  pesticide  residue  standards  were extended  to  53  food items
and 28 pesticides.  Standards were planned  to be set on all food  items and 200 pesticides
by the year 2000.
On the other hand, around 30 percent of the pesticides marketed in the developing
countries  do  not  meet  the  international  standards  (WHO  2001).  The  poor  quality
pesticides  are mostly prevalent in sub-Saharan  Africa, where  regulations  are very weak.
Lack  of  administrative  regulatory  capacity  and  agricultural  development  programs
partially cause the unsafe use of pesticides in the developing countries (Paarlberg  1992).
Efforts  have  been  made  to  develop  guidelines  for  global  food  trade  by
international standard development bodies.  The Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues
(CCPR)  a  subsidiary  body of the  Codex  Alimentarius  Commission  (Codex)  develops
MRL based on food consumption data in order to ensure that it stays within the  limits of
ADI.  The  Global Environment Monitoring System-Food  Contamination  Monitoring and
Assessment  Program (GEMS/Food),  in collaboration with CCPR (FAO/WHO)  prepared
the guidelines for predicting dietary intake of pesticide residue  in 1989. These guidelines
assist in the formulation of international dietary exposure assessments  for most pesticides.
Certain  pesticides  require  more  accurate  and  detailed  guidelines  for  dietary  exposure
9  Pesticide  residue standards in food.  1997, Public Health  no. 16 December.  Sapporo City Institute of Public
Health.  httn://www.city.sapporo.jp/eiken/various/pesticid/a-ri.htm
10assessment.  The  guidelines  were revised  in  1995 that  provided the basis  for exposure
assessment  of  long  term  hazards  posed  by  pesticide  residues  at  the  national  and
international  levels.  These guidelines  are detailed  enough in order to provide reasonable
assurance that the Codex MRLs will not result in a dietary intake of a pesticide that will
exceed its ADI, and hence convince national authorities to adopt Codex standards.
4.  Banana markets and policies
In  the  world  banana  trade,  the  developing  countries'  share  is  68  percent  (UN
Comtrade  Records,  1998).10  The  developing  countries'  share  of bananas  to  the  total
developing countries'  fruits and vegetables  exports is  14 percent.  As shown in Table  1,
the United  States,  Japan and  EU countries  are major  importers  of bananas.  Central  and
South American countries and several EU countries are major exporters of bananas.
Banana  production  involves  various  stages  of processing  and  marketing,  which
promotes  vertical integration.  This has made the  industry oligopolistic,  being  dominated
by multinational enterprises  such as Chiquita Brands, Inc.,  Dole Food Company,  and Del
Monte  Foods Company  (Carlos,  1981).  These  enterprises  are particularly  dominant  in
Latin America.
The banana market underwent a drastic  change in the early to mid  1  990s when the
Common Market Organization  (CMO) for bananas introduced  in July 1993 was extended
to the  Single  European Market  (SEM).  Under the  Single  European Market, the various
national schemes throughout the EU were harmonized and replaced by a common market
regulation  for  bananas.  Before  harmonization  occurred,  Germany  had  no  tariffs  on
imports and Denmark,  Belgium, Luxembourg  and Ireland had 20 percent tariff ra.tes.  In
'° The data are total value of bananas and plantains.  But bananas have  a dominant share at 99 percent.countries  such  as  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Portugal  and  Spain,  market  access  was
determined  by  national  quotas.  Hence,  the  banana  market  in  Europe  was  highly
segmented  before 1993.
The harmonization  policy  was  opposed  by member  countries  such  as  Germany
(applying  zero  tariffs  on  imports  from  third  countries)  and  also  Denmark,  Belgium,
Luxembourg  and  Ireland  (applying  20  percent  tariffs  on  imports  from  non-member
countries),  which  had  low  banana  prices  and  expected  large  price  increases  with
harmonization.  Banana exporting Latin and Central American countries also opposed the
EU policy.  Under the new regime,  the ACP (African Caribbean  and Pacific  Countries),
suppliers were allowed up to 857.7 thousand tons of duty free exports.  However the third
countries  (non ACP suppliers)  including  the dollar exporters"  had to face tariffs  of 100
ECUs per ton for a 2 million ton quota.  The ACP  suppliers  had country specific  quota
and countries  like Cameroon  and Cote d'Ivoire met their  quota levels.  These  countries
were categorized  as non-traditional  ACP banana  suppliers and they faced the same tariff-
quota regime  as the non-ACP  countries  (Thagesen  and Mathews  ,1997  and Verissimo,
2001)
A  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  panel  led  by  Colombia,
Costa  Rica,  Guatemala,  Nicaragua  and  Venezuela  argued  that  the  preferential  trading
agreement  between  EU and the ACP  countries  were  inconsistent with the provisions  of
GATT.  This led to a change  in the CMO regime,  and the four Latin American  countries
except Guatemala reached an agreement  with the EU in December 22,  1994 known as the
Banana Framework Agreement (Thagesen and Mathews,  1997). The quota was increased
" Dollar exporting countries include Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Ecuador and
Brazil.
12to  2.2 million tons,  and the  specific tariff was reduced to 75  ECUs per ton for the third
countries.  The  four  Banana  Framework  Agreement  (BFA)  countries,  Costa  Rica,
Colombia,  Nicaragua  and  Venezuela  had  49.4%  share  of 2.2  million  tons.  A  further
90,000  tone quota was  allocated  to the non-traditional  ACP suppliers  that  include  Cote
d'Ivoire,  Cameroon,  Belize  and  Dominican  Republic.  The  remaining  50.6%  minus
90,000  tones  went  to  the  third  countries  i.e.  the  non  BFA  countries  and  was  mainly
shared by Ecuador,  Panama, Honduras and Guatemala. (refer to Table 2).
With  a ruling  from the  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  Panel  in  late  1999,  the  third
country quota was further increased to 2.55 million tons, with a specific tariff of 75 Euros
per ton (McCorriston,  2000).  These quotas were further assigned to each of the non-ACP
exporting  countries.  Among  those,  Columbia,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  and  Panama
accounted  for 95  percent of the  total quota  share  assigned to  the third  countries.  Each
allocation is 23.03, 25.61, 26.17 and 15.76 percent, respectively.
Whether these EU quotas were binding, actual banana  exports from the ACP and
non-ACP countries were examined by the WTO in April  1999.  The WTO reports that the
total exports from the ACP countries  were below the total quota of 857.7 thousand tons,
but  that  the  quotas  on  the  non-ACP  countries  were  actually  binding  in  1998
(WT/DS27/ARB, WTO,  1999).
Considering  the  fact  that  in  the  late  1980's,  about  75  percent  of the  world's
bananas were exported  by the Latin American countries,  it is not surprising that Kersten
(1995) finds that, under the new regime,  the Latin American banana  exporting countries
lost  market  share.  The  cost  to  EU consumers  has risen  to  US$  2 billion  a  year  from
US$  400 million a year,  a huge portion of the cost being  redistributed  from the French
13and  the  British  to  the  Germans,  who  had  no  tariff  before  the  Common  Market
Organization  took place  (Borrell,  1997).  The  U.S.  has three  big  banana  distributors,
namely Chiquita, Dole and Del Monte, who lost market share to the EU competing firms
due to harmonization.
5.  The econometric  model and data
The  eleven  importing  countries  studied  include,  6  EU  countries  (Belgium,
Luxembourg,  France,  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  United  Kingdom),  Canada,
Japan,  New  Zealand,  Switzerland,  and  the  United  States.  The  nineteen  exporting
countries  studied include  10  Central  and  South American  Countries  (Argentina,  Brazil,
Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Mexico,  Panama),  4
African  countries  (Cameroon,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Morocco  and  South  Africa),  5  Asian
countries  (China, India,  Indonesia,  Philippines  and Taiwan).  These  exporting  countries
are the major  exporters of bananas  in each region.  The six EU countries  are aggregated
and treated as one country.
A gravity model  is used to analyze  the effects  of pesticide  residue  standards on
bilateral  trade  flows,  using  the  key  economic  variables  that  represent  the  size  of  a
country's  economy  such as Gross National  Product  (GNP)  and population,  and also the
geographical  distance  between the  variable  countries  is used.  A Logarithm  of bilateral
trade  flows  in  real  value  is  regressed  on  logarithms  of GNP of the  exporters  and  the
importers,  geographical  distance  between  each pair of importers  and exporters, pesticide
residue  standards  for  chlorpyrifos  in  the  importing  country,  rainfall  levels  in  the
exporting  countries,  and dummies for a free trade agreement (FTA),  colonial  ties,  years,
and regional dummies.
14The specification of the gravity model  is as follows:
ln(Vut)  = bo + bjln(GNP!,)+ b2ln(GNPj)  + b3ln(POPi) + b4ln(POPj) + bsln(DISTj,)
+b61n(PSTj) + b7ln(RAINj)  +b8DBFA+ b9DNBFA+ bJODNTAcp+ bl]DAPEc + bI2DNA'FTA
+b  3DEucoL# +bJ4DusAcoL# + b15D]997+ bj6DJ99± 
8
q
where  i  and j  stand  for  the  importer  and  exporter  respectively,  and  t  denotes;  time.
Parameter  b's are coefficients,  and 6#  is the  error term that  is assumed  to be  normally
distributed  with mean zero.  The data used here is for the time period  1997 to  1999.  V,
denotes  the  value  of trade  from  countryj  to  country  i.  It  is  obtained  from the  trade
database of the United Nations Statistical Office.  Banana and plantains (SITC Revision  1
code  of 0513)  are the  products  included here  for the  analysis.  GNPi, POPi, GNPj, and
POPj are  the  real  Gross  National  Products  (expressed  in  1995  U.S.  dollars)  and
populations  for the  importing and  exporting  countries,  respectively,  were obtained from
the World Development Indicators  of the World Bank for the period of 1997-19993.  The
total GNP and population is used for the EU.  DISTU is the geographical distance  between
country  i  and j.  The  rainfall  data  (RAIN;)  is  included,  since  it  affects  the  level  of
production in the exporting  countries.  The data  source  is the surface  data inventories of
the U.S. National  Climatic  Data Center.  The  average rainfall  and distance among the  6
EU countries is used for the EU.
PSTi  is  the  maximum  residue  limit  of the  pesticide  chlorpyrifos,  imposed  on
imports by the  importing  country i.  The maximum  residue  limit (MRL)  is expressed  in
parts per million (ppm), and was obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
New  Zealand.  A  higher  (lower)  value  of the  standard  implies  more  lax  (stringent)
15regulation  of the  pesticide  residue  limit.  Assuming  that  the  regulation  on  pesticide
residue limits are  strictly imposed by importing countries,  chlorpyrifos residues  contents
in the imported  bananas  are  less  than the MRLs  of the  individual  importing  countries.
The  0.05  ppm  standard  is  used  for  the  EU  because  all but the  Netherlands  had  this
standard.  The  validity  of this  assumption  is  tested  in  the  post-regression  analysis  by
omitting the Netherland from the EU.  The coefficient  for the pesticide residue  standard
implies  that the  change  in the  value  of trade  for  an  incremental  change  in  the residue
standard.  The coefficient is expected to be positive if this standard limits trade.
The tariff-quota  system that the EU have  exercised  on banana imports may have
had distinct effects  on their trade flows.  It is not precisely known in many cases whether
quota was binding or not, and what tariff rate are applied to each exporting  countries in a
given  year.  It  is  therefore  difficult  to  specify  in the  model  how the  EU  tariff-quota
policies  might affect trade flow.  -Dummy variables  for EU tariff-quota arrangements are
used  to  control  for  the  effect  of the  tariff-quota  system  while  the  inclusion  of these
dummy  variables  necessarily  imposes  the assumption that the  vaiue  of banana imports
from all exporting countries within a given EU tariff-quota regime to the EU increases or
decreases  in  a  same  proportion  by  the  regime.  As  Table  2  indicates,  there  are  four
mutually exclusive groups of countries  that export bananas to the EU,  (1)  BFA, (2) non-
BFA  and  non-ACP,  (3)  non-BFA  and  traditional  ACP,  and  (4)  non-BFA  and  non-
traditional  ACP.  For example,  the  dummy for BFA supplier equals one if EU countries
import from a BFA supplier, and zero  otherwise.  Likewise the dummy variables for the
other  groups.  A  dummy variable  for the  second  group  is not included  in the  analysis
since there is no ACP country in our sample.  Assuming that there is no other systematic
16tariff-quota  arrangement  between  the  rest  of the  OECD  countries  and  our  exporting
countries,  the EU tariff-quota  arrangement  dummies  can be used to  compared  with no-
arrangement  cases.  Thus,  we  can  test  (1)  whether  the  EU  tariff-quota  arrangement
actually  encouraged  or  discouraged  banana  trade,  and  (2)  how  the  effect  of the  EU's
differential treatment of exporting countries differ from each other.
Colonial  tie  dummies  are  included  to  control  the  omitted  variable  effect  of
colonial  ties on trade flows (Otsuki et al., 2001a,  2001b,  Wilson and Otsuki, 2001).  The
NAFTA  and  APEC  dummies  (DAPEC and  DNAFTA,  respectively),  are  included  to  capture
the trade promoting  effects due to free trade agreement.  Year dummies, D1997 and D1998,
are included in the model to control for systematic differences across time.
A Fixed-Effect model is estimated and reported in Table 3 assuming that country-
specific  effects  vary  systematically  among  the  exporting  countries.  The  results  for
alternative  specifications are also presented  in the table.  The model in the second column
omits the population  variables of both importing and exporting countries.  This is done to
examine whether the result of the full model (Model D)  is robust against multicollinearity
between  the  GNP  and  population  variables.  The  model  in the  third  column,  instead,
omits the EU tariff-quota arrangement dummies in order to examine the robustness of the
result when this arrangement is not accounted for.
In  Models  I,  II  and  III,  an  importing  country's  GNP  is  significant  while  an
importing  country's  population  is  insignificant.  Geographic  distance  is  negative  and
significant  as  expected.  The  comparison  between  Model  I  and  II  indicates  that  the
magnitude  of the  coefficient  estimates  greatly  change  with  or  without  the  population
variables,  suggesting  high multicollinearily  between  the  GNP  and  population  variables.
17However,  the coefficient estimates for the other explanatory  variables are close enough to
support  that the  specification  with respect  to the  GNP  and  population variables  do not
matter much.
The  chlorpyrifos  standard is positive and significant in the all three models.  The
difference  in the  coefficient  estimates between Model  I  and II  indicates  a slight  sign of
multicollinearity  between  the  standards  and  population  variables,  but  it  is  acceptably
small.  The positive  sign indicates  that banana  imports  are greater for a country that has
less stringent standards on pesticide residues.  The results support the hypothesis that this
pesticide  standard  can  have  a  trade  diversion  effect.  The  evidence  indicates  that
decisions  on  banana  export  destinations  are  made  considering  these  pesticide  residue
standards when the other major determinants of the trade such as GNP, population, trade
policies and the other country specific effects are controlled.
The magnitude of the coefficient  (1.48) in the Model I, which can be described as
the  elasticity  of  chlorpyrifos  standard  for  bilateral  trade  flow,  shows  a  high
responsiveness  of banana exports.  This elasticity is greater than the case of the Aflatoxin
B1  standard  for  cereals  and  nuts  (from  0.34  to  1.12)  that  are  found  in  Wilson  and
Otsuki's  (mimeo)  cross  country  study  on  aflatoxin  standards.  The  validity  of the
assumption that all the six EU countries follow a single  standard is examined by omitting
the Netherlands when aggregating the variables for the EU.  The magnitude and statistical
significance  of this coefficient  estimate  are  found to be unchanged  under the alternative
data  construction,  and  those  of  the  other  explanatory  variables  found  not  to  differ
between the two cases.  This implies that the single standard assumption is acceptable.
18The rainfall variable is insignificant.  Most of the exporting countries  in this study
are located close to the tropics where  the rainfall  is heavy.  The result perhaps indicates
that  having  a higher  level of rainfall  among these  countries  does not necessarily  imply
higher productivity of banana production.
The results  with respect to the  EU  tariff-quota  arrangement  generally  indicate  a
higher trade  flow  under the arrangement.  Non-BFA  signatories  among  non-traditional
ACP countries  exported more due to the arrangement with other things being fixed.  The
effect  of the  arrangement  is  insignificant  on  the  BFA  signatories,  however.  The
comparison  between  Model  I  and III  indicates  that the  coefficient  estimates  for the key
explanatory  variables are not affected by the omission of these dummies.  The coefficient
for the standards variable is particularly almost unchanged.
The colonial tie dummies are insignificant.  This is presumably  because the EU's
tariff-quota  arrangement  in large part reflected  preferential  arrangement  for their former
colonies.  The APEC dummy is positive and significant,  suggesting that the FTA works
favorably  on  the  member  countries.  On  the  other  hand,  the  NAFTA  dummy  is
insignificant,  suggesting that it is not the case.
6.  Simulation
Table  4 presents  the  changes  in the  values  of the  banana  exports  from  the  19
exporting countries  under four alternative  regulatory  scenarios from those under the pre-
harmonization  status.  These alternative  scenarios  include  (1) when all importers  follow
the standard of 0.05 ppm  (the standard for EU countries  except for the Netherlands);  (2)
when a standard of 0.1  ppm followed by all importers  (the standard for the U.S.,  Canada
19and Switzerland);  (3) when a harmonized  standard of 0.5  ppm is followed  (the standard
for Japan and the Netherlands);  and (4) when the standard is 2 ppm (New Zealand).  The
2.0  ppm standard is also recommended  by the Codex  as an international  standard.  We
assume  that the  predicted  increase  or  decrease  in the  value  of export will  exceed  100
percent of the pre-harmonization  level for each importing exporting country pair in order
to avoid unrealistic cases; i.e.,  negative exports or more than double export.
Under the first scenario, all countries lose due to the standard of 0.05 ppm.  China,
Taiwan  and  South-East  Asia  are  predicted  to  lose  more  in percentage,  as their  major
trading  partner  is  Japan,  which  had  relatively  less  stringent  standard  under  the  pre-
harmonization  status.  The  Philippines  loss  is the  greatest in terms  of level  as  it is the
largest banana  exporter  in  Asia.  On the  contrary,  the  loss  experienced  by the  African
countries is less as they have mainly exported  to the EU in the pre-harmonization,  which
had the most stringent standard.  The percentage  losses of Latin American countries will
be between those extremes  since their banana exports have been diversified  between the
EU and the U.S.  Among these countries,  Costa Rica, Guatemala,  Columbia and Ecuador
account for the significant part of these losses in terms of level as expected.  The India's
percentage loss is greater than those of Latin America because its major export partner is
the U.S.
When  the  standard  is  relaxed  to  0.1  ppm,  15  of the  exporting  countries  are
predicted  to  increase  in export  while  China,  Indonesia  and Phlippines  and Taiwan  will
still  lose.  This  is because  the Japan's pre-harmonization  standard  is  still less stringent
than  this  standard.  Among  the  countries  that  increase  export,  African  countries  will
increase most due to the EU's stringent pre-harmonization  standard.
20At  the standard  of 2.0  ppm, which  is also  recommended  by the  Codex,  all  the
exporting countries will increase their exports by 96.7 to 100 percent.  The total values of
banana exports under the most stringent  standard  is US$  1.8  billion or 49.1  percent  less
than that  under the pre-harmonization  status.  The  least  stringent (Codex)  standard  will
lead  to a US$ 3.5 billion increase  in banana exports.  The total values of banana exports
under the most stringent standards  differ by US$  5.3  billion or 75  lower than that under
the  least  stringent  (Codex)  standard  scenario.  This  implies  that  the  both  pre-
harmonization  and the  EU  standards  will lead  to a trade  flow significantly  smaller than
that under the internationally recommended  standard.
7.  Conclusion
Understanding  the  trade-offs  between  public  health,  food  productivity  and
economic  development  is  essential  for  crafting  efficient  regulatory  and  trade  policies.
The purpose of this paper  is to  shed light  on implication  of pesticide  residue standards.
This  paper  employs  a  gravity model  to examine  the  relationship  between  chlorpyrifos
pesticide  standards  and  banana  exports  from  19  major  exporting  countries  in  the
developing regions to major importing countries in the OECD group.
The  results  indicate  a negative  effect  of chlorpyrifos  standard  imposed  by  the
OECD countries on banana  exports  from the  studied exporting countries.  A ten percent
increase  in regulatory stringency - tighter restrictions on the pesticide chlorpyrifos - leads
to a decrease of banana imports  by  1.48 percent.  Our simulation analysis  based on the
gravity model parameter  estimates  indicate  a significant  difference  in trade  flow under
alternative  regulatory scenarios.  It is estimated that US$  5.3 billion in lost exports occur
21per year if an  international  standard  were  set  at  EU  levels  of regulatory  stringency  in
contract to a world standard set by Codex at the internationally-recommended  level.
A  comparable  estimate  of the  effect  of a tighter pesticide  residue  standard  on
health of consumers who benefit from decreased level of pesticide use in imported food is
not available.  Our result suggests, however,  that the costs of higher food safety standards
imposed  by  importing  countries  can  be  considerable.  Scientific  findings  on  pesticide
hazards  do indicate  that  greater risks  are  borne  by farm  workers  and  those  exposed  to
pesticide residues  in the air, soil and drinking water.  Health hazards  are predominant  in
developing  countries  simply because  of relatively more unsafe techniques  involved  with
pesticide  use,  poor  health  condition  among  the  population,  and  use  of  more  toxic
pesticides.  A reduced health risk associated with a tighter pesticide  residue standard may
offset the  direct losses and losses in potential productivity  losses from reduced  pesticide
applications.
Balancing  risk,  health,  and  trade  is  further  complicated  when  considering
alternatives  to pesticide  use,  such  as introduction  of genetically  modified  organisms  to
control pests,  or investment  in organic  foods.  The growing  market for organic  foods in
the  United  States and  Europe may provide  alternative  opportunities  for  food exporting
countries.  For example,  organic  products  exported  from the  Dominican  Republic  now
amount to around 20 percent of fruit and vegetable  exports (Holderness  et al.,  1999).  In
the  Dominican  Republic,  organic  banana  production  now  involves  some  2,500
smallholder farmers (Holderness et al.).
22Table 1. Major World Importers and Exporters of Bananas and Plantains
Top  10 Importer  Value  %of  the  Top  10 Exporter  Value  % of the
($US  World  ($US  World
million)  Total  million)  Total
United States of America  1,389  20%  Ecuador  954  20%
Germany  689  17%  Belgium-Luxembourg  800  17%
Belgium-Luxembourg  556  12%  Costa Rica  564  12%
Japan  548  12%  Colombia  560  12%
United Kingdom  534  5%  Philippines  241  5%
Italy  346  4%  Panama  184  4%
France  201  3%  Italy  165  3%
Sweden  152  3%  United States of America  161  3%
Russian Federation  151  3%  France  151  3%
Canada  149  3%  Guatemala  147  3%
Source:  Food and Agricultural Organization  (1998).
Table 2. The Banana Trade Regime effective  December 22,  1994 (Banana
Framework Agreement)
Traditional ACP  Countries not categorized as traditional ACP banana suppliers
banana suppliers  (quota=2.2  million tone)
(quota=857, 700
tone)
BFA countries  Non-traditional ACP  Non BFA countries
(quota=l1.1  million  banana suppliers  (quota=ll.0 million
tone)  (quota=90,000 tone)  tone)
African Caribbean  *Costa Rica,  *Cote d'Ivoire,  The rest of the
and Pacific  *Colombia,  *Cameroon, Belize,  countries
Countries except  Nicaragua,  Dominican Republic




Countries with "*" are in the sample for our analysis.
23Table 3. Regression  Results
Model I  Model II  Model III
Dependent variable: Log(Value of trade
flow)
Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.
Constant  -28.38*  15.20  -5.75  14.28  -46.35***  13.81
Log (Importing country's  GNP)  3.30***  0.68  0.88***  0.17  3.29***  0.70
Log (Exporting country's  GNP)  1.57  1.91  0.53  0.52  1.58  1.99
Log (Importing country's Population)  -2.68***  0.73  -2.59***  0.74
Log (Exporting country's Population)  -0.26  2.03  0.51  2.05
Log (Geographic  distance)  -2.18***  0.47  -2.06***  0.48  -1.76***  0.48
Log (Chlorpyrifos  Standard)  1.48***  0.29  1.34***  0.29  1.45***  0.30
Log (Rainfall)  -0.12  1.22  0.06  1.24  -0.24  1.27
Dummies for BFA  0.89  1.48  1.29  1.49
Dummies for non-BFA  3.35***  1.15  3.91***  1.14
Dummies fornon-ACP  6.18***  1.74  5.19***  1.76
Dummies for Colonial ties to the EU  -0.40  1.28  -0.07  1.27  0.14  0.99
Dummies for Colonial ties to USA  0.27  1.76  0.28  1.81  -0.24  1.83
Dummies for NAFTA member  1.87  1.46  1.67  1.50  2.11  1.52
Dummies for APEC member  1.68*  0.93  0.66  0.89  2.62***  0.89
Dummies for year  1998  -0.02  0.48  0.23  0.45  0.02  0.50
Dummies for year 1999  0.14  0.42  0.23  0.43  0.20  0.44
Adjusted R-squared  0.534  0.503  0.484
Number of observation used  240  240  240
Note: A fixed-effects model is used with exporting  countries as cross-section.
The notations "*", "**", and "***"  imply the 10,  5 and I percent significance,  respectively.
24Table 4.  Change in Trade Flows under Different Harmonization Scenarios
Compared with Pre-Harmonization Status by Exporting Countries (without the EU
quota in place)
Harmonized  0.05 ppm  0.1 ppm  0.5 ppm  2.0 ppm
level
Pre-  France, Germany,  USA, Canada,  Japan,  the  New Zealand
Harmonization  UK, Belgium,  Switzerland  Netherlands  Codex
level of  Luxembourg
(US$  1,000)  %  (US$  1,000)  %  (US$  1,000)  %  (US$  1,000)  %
change  change  change  change
Exporters
Cote d'Ivoire  -445  -0.4  117,942  99.5  118,547  100  118,547  100
Cameroon  -127  -0.1  109,084  99.8  109,256  100  109,256  100
Morocco  -3  -6.1  45  91.8  49  100  49  100
South Africa  -9  -3.5  245  95  256  99.2  258  100
China  -5,655  -99.7  -5,632  -99.3  25  0.4  5,673  100
Indonesia  -363  -98.9  -356  -97  7  1.9  367  100
India  -140  -64.8  26  12  216  100  216  100
Philippines  -335,744  -99.8  -334,465  -99.5  -1,645  -0.5  332,987  99
Taiwan,  China  -46,799  -100  -46,780  -99.9  21  0  46,814  100
Costa Rica  -360,202  -46.8  277,916  36.1  766,138  99.6  768,981  100
Guatemala  -143,935  -65.5  24,384  11.1  219,883  100  219,883  100
Honduras  -90,508  -55.7  39,701  24.4  162,632  100  162,632  100
Mexico  -54,062  -71.3  1,199  1.6  73,848  97.4  75,727  99.9
Panama  -41,919  -17.9  177,278  75.6  233,385  99.5  233,995  99.7
Argentina  -3  -1.5  197  98  201  100  201  100
Brazil  -811  -28.6  1,732  61.1  2,833  100  2,833  100
Chile  -73  -48.3  52  34.4  151  100  151  100
Colombia  -206,862  -34.9  312,205  52.6  593,173  100  593,173  100
Ecuador  -461,353  -52.1  177,907  20.1  730,463  82.5  856,589  96.7
Total  -1,749,013  -49.1  852,680  23.9  3,009,439  84.5  3,528,332  99.1
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